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LEGISLATION
power of rescission of E. But it is important not only that H shall buy
but that E will pay. E will more readily pay if he can be assured
that in the case of essential mistake he will be entitled to rescind. So
there are two cbnflicting interestS. But the balance seems to be in
favor of H. E is under pressure to pay or accept. Then there is the
policy of maintaining confidence in negotiable paper by making the
and place for the
time or place of payment or acceptance the time
17
final settlement, as between drawee and holder.
The theory of commercial interests seems to be the true reason
for the rule-a rule that has worked well in substantially all' jurisdictions in- the United States. Before the adoption of the N. I. L., the
rule was in force in the great majority of jurisdictions in this country,
there being only two exceptions (North Dakota and Oklahoma). Since
the adoption of the N. I. L. there seems to be only one exceptionOklahoma.
In the third case, involving an extension of the doctrine of Price v.
Neal, we have essential error in the transaction between H and E.
Prima facie E has the power of rescission. But commercial interests
extend to rights on this acceptance, and H should be entitled to retain
the money, in case of payment, and H should be entitled to enforce
the acceptance, free from any power of rescission on the part of E.
Austin J. Barlow.
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URIMINAL LAW-PROPOSAL FOR REFOR

IN ILLiNoIs.-Complaint

of criminal law and procedure in the United Statesis a commonplace.
Bench, bar, and community, with reasonable provocation, deplore our
criminal law and procedure as frustrating the expeditious administration of justice and, consequently, defeating the purpose of its enactment. Criminal procedure in this country has been indicted as archaic,
slow, uncertain, and, on countless occasions, the rigidity of our substantive law of crimes has suffered by comparison with the elasticity
of the criminal law that is England's.
As to the merit of this scathing criticism anyone who has sat in
one of our courtrooms and observed the laboring progress of a criminal
hearing will give ample and sufficiently cogent testimony.. A casual
observer is disgusted with the many and varied technical objections
and exceptions that infest a criminal cause. This will certainly be the
effect on one aware that the simple issue of the trial is the guilt of the
accused. To him the red tape and legal-hairsplitting will be, at the
best, unnecessary and nauseating, at the worst.
17

Woo0w0wA,

op. cit. supra note 5, § 86.
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No one denies that criminal jurisprudence in America is antiquated
and frightfully inadequate. That reformation of procedure and simplification of criminal law is necessary is a truism. ,It is, in a way,
consoling to know that these crying demands are not altogether
unheard; but it is, to say the least, discouraging to realize that despite
many honest and commendable attempts to reform our criminal body
of laws so little has been remedied.
Resistance to reform has come from various sources. Lawyers,
strange to say, have furnished no little strength to, the formidable
ranks of obstructionists. The opposition of lawyers is felt especially
because the influence they have in shaping the law of the land. The
legislatures in the several states are, in the main, composed of men
who havepracticed and who intend to continue in the practice of
law. Thus the men who have the immediate power to correct and
simplify criminal law profit by its very complexity. This adverse
interest of our legislators accounts in no small degree, for the involved
condition of our criminal codes. In serving their personal interests
lawyers have forgotten the higher interest of the community.
The main source of opposition to reform, however, springs from
that well-meaning but unduly cautious class of obstructionists who
have an inordinate dread of reposing even a modicum of discretion in
the judiciary; and, as a result literally bind the courts hand and foot
by technical legislation. Unfortunately, in their attempt to safeguard
the innocent man who is accused they have opened wide the door for
the accused to walk away from justice.
Such is the present state of' criminal law throughout the Union.
Yet, with the exception of the commendable work achieved last summer by the Committee on Uniform Laws, no extensive plan to improve
this deplorable state of affairs is underway. There is, however, one
'glimmer which if not extinguished will unmistakably brighten the
whole body of American law. Reference is made to the proposal of
the Illinois and Cook County Advisory Councils for the simplification
of the Illinois Criminal Code. The proposal is to be submitted to the
Illinois Legislature at its next regular session in January. It is interesting to conjecture what disposition this plan, which is the product
of mature thought and the creature of some of the most fertile legal
minds of the Illinois bar, will meet with at the hands of the lawmaking body in Illinois.
The proposal of the Councils has features which ought to commend
it to the Illinois assembly. Its single purpose is to improve the criminal code of that state. This end has been attained by simplifying
procedure and by complete renovation of the present substantive law
of crimes. A consideration of the provisions of this plan will show
conclusively that it excels the criminal codes of the several states;
that it makes the administration of criminal law more equitable and
certain; and, that it sets a precedent the influence of which will be
far-reaching.
In the first place the plan proposes that a number of offenses
hitherto considered felonies will be reduced- to misdemeanors. Thus
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treason, murder, manslaughter, robbery with a gun, rape, arson ot a
dwelling house, kidnapping for ransom, and bombing will be still
punishable as felonies by imprisonment in the penitentiary, or, where
the offense is capital by death. But attempts to commit the enumerated crimes and conviction of less repugnant crimes; such as, embezzlement, larceny, and forgery, which are now held to be felonies, ire
made misdemeanors punishable in any institution other than a penitentiary for a period not to exceed three years.
By recognizing this fine distinction in the magnitude of crimes and
-by punishing them according to their nature, the Councils have not
only called into play a principle of justice that is fundamental; but
they have made punishment of crime more certain. It goes without
saying that a jury will convict more readily if a prosecutor asks that a
punishment commensurate with the gravity of the offense be inflicted
than when he seeks a punishment out of all proportion to the enormity
of the offense. When juries start returning verdicts of "guilty," triminality will decrease noticeably. No principle of criminology is less
disputable than that promptness and certainty of punishment are more
effective for the deterrence of crime than severity of punishment.
Another feature of the plan which merits consideration is the proposal that the more serious misdemeanors; namely, forgery, larceny,
and attempts to commit felonies, shall be punishable on the second
offense by life imprisonment. Thus while the Illinois plan reduces
crimes ordinarily considered felonies to misdemeanors, consequently,
showing consideration for the possible lack of criminality in the first
offender, it at the same time provides that an adequate penalty be
imposed upon the habitual and incorrigible criminal. Further than
that the automatic imposition of life imprisonment in the penitentiary
upon conviction a second time of this class of misdemeanor 'ought to
have no little deterrent effect upon the most calloused criminal.
The plan goes on further and provides for a second class of misdemeanors. They are crimes less repugnant to the state. Included in
this category are prostitution, carrying concealed weapons, and driving
while intoxicated. These misdemeanors are punishable as misdemeanors of the first class, that is to say, they are punishable by three years
imprisonment, except that they are never punishable by imprisonment
in the penitentiary.
A last provision for improving the substantive criminal law provides
for the punishment of less serious misdemeanors and petty offenses.
The former includes the compounding of crimes, malfeasance in office
where no funds are involved, and frauds where no money is lost.
These offenses are punishable by six months imprisonment and a fine
of $200. The latter, petty offenses, are punishable by not more than
thirty days imprisonment and a fine of $200.
The balance of the plan has for its purpose' reform of the procedural part of Illinois Criminal Code. This is brought about by
simplification of the indictment, limiting the necessity of grand juries
and giving discretion to the court to fix the punishment of the accused
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within maximum and minimum limits, the jury first having determined
the issue of guilt.
By the present cbde in Illinois, the jury is allowed to determine
not only the guilt or innocence of the accused but also the extent of
his punishment, Juries, however, are not qualified to .impose punishment on a criminal. Punishment should be meted out with a view to
the reformation of the offender. While a judge is by no means the
most competent one to analyze the condition of the criminal and prescribe a remedy, he is infinitely more qualified, than a jury whose
punishment for the most part is the result of emotion and, as often
as not, arbitrary. The great power of fixing the sentence of the criminal is so often abused by juries that it will surely be safer in the
hands of judges. For these reasons this particular provision of the
Councils' plan can have only a 'salutary effect.
The proposal of the Illinois and Cook County Advisory Councils
is being submitted to the legislature only after extensive research, and
mature thought. The Councils made an exhaustive study of the criminal codes of the several states and Canada. If adopted by the Illinois
Assembly the new criminal code will indubitably put Illinois out in
front of other states in criminal legislation. More than that it will set
a precedent that will tend to encourage the people and legislators of
other states to modernize their obsolete criminal codes. If, on the
other hand, this plan is repudiated by the law-making body of Illinois
when they convene next January, all the splendid efforts of the Illinois
and Cook County Judicial Advisory Councils will be in vain, proponents of reform will be disheartened and prospects of nationwide
reform of criminal law will be extremely darkened. What will be the
verdict of the Illinois Legislature?
William Lee O'Malley

DECLATORY JUDGMiENTS-IN

GENERAL-INDIANA

IN

PARTICULAR.

-A Declaratory Judgment allows persons who'are uncertain as to
their rights and duties to ask a ruling from a court as to the legal
effect of an act before they have progressed with it to a point where
anyone has been injured. England has been much more enterprising
in regard to recognizing declaratory judgments than wein the United
States. As far back as 1852,1 the English Parlinment passed a Declaratory Judgment Act which provided that the court could give advice
to parties with or without coercive relief at the option of parties. The
present status of the law in England is that any person claiming to
be interested in a deed, will or other written instrument, may apply
by originating a summons for the determination of a question of construction arising under an instrument, for a declaration of rights of
the person interested. The greatest objection which English Courts
found in giving declaratory judgments was that a court may, not
I Victoria, C. 86.
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express opinions in regard to construction for the mere information of
the parties, disconnected from some equitable relief sought. England
overcame this objection in 1883 when Parliament passed an act declaring that, "No action or proceeding shall be open to objection on the
ground that'a mere declaratory judgment 'or order is sought thereby
and the court may make binding declarations of right whether any
consequential relief is, could or could not be claimed."
Professor Sunderland has said 'that "Prior to 1883, the English
courts were employed only as repair shops; since that time have beer
operated as service stations." 3 'he advantages that prospective litigants in England have over the same persons in the United States are
manifold. There, through declaratory judgments, litigation is a friendly
suit, and not a personal animosity. Here, to prosecute a suit is usually
to start a fight, and many just causes are not litigated because of the
desire riot to break friendships. In. England, the court in declaratory
judgments operates as a diplomatic, instead of a belligerent agency.
The defendant is treated as a gentleman and not as a wrongdoer. The
court becomes the guardian and advisor of those who respect the law.
It is a great advantage from the pecuniary' standpoint to have a question decided before breach. To hold that a man must violate the law
in order to ascertain its validity or construction, is a barbaric requirement, to say the least. Professor Borchard has truly said "To hold
that one must breach a contract before securing a judgment pronouncement upon its obscure terms, is not in harmony with any true concept
of justice. To rectify this, declaratory judgments are now legalized."
Many of our courts have objected to these judgments on the ground
that they deprive one of his constitutional right of trial by jury. On
the contrary, they do not deprive one of his constitutional guarantees
as these judgments are declaratory or advisory opinions only. Many
attempts to introduce declaratory judgments into the United States
were defeated between the years 1875 and 1910. Among these cases
is Greeley v. Nashua,4 where the plaintiff requested the court to iMform
them what their legal rights and those of defendants were in the
property devised by a will. The court held that such questions are not
ordinarily adjudicated until it becomes necessary to decide them in
proceedings instituted for the redress of wrongs. In Bevans v. Bevans,
Chancellor Magie said, "It is settled that the court will not express
opinions in regard to construction for the mere information of parties
'disconnected from some equitable relief 'sought." This view was followed by many states, some of them denouncing these judgments even
more rigorously than the two cases above. It was not a very promising
outlook for the framers wh3 attempted in our country the first Declaratory Judgment Acts. Florida was the first to attempt an act in 1919.
2 16 Mich. L. REv. 74 (1917).
3 Sunderland, A Modern Evolution in Remedial Rights,-The Declaratory
Judgment (1917), 16 MicH. L. Rzv. 69, 77.
4 61 Ind. 457 (1878).
5 69 N. J. Eq. 1 (1905).
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The most severe objection it met was that this would be nothing more
than a mooted question before the court. This objection is unfounded
as a moot case is easily distinguished from a declaratory judgment. A
moot case is imaginary, does not exist in fact, and to decide it serves
no useful purpose; nothing is adjudicated, no actual rights are determined, and nothing is affected. Whereas a declaratory judgment must
always deal with a real dispute of a real fact; it must deal with actual
rights of existing litigants.
The State of Indiana was not among the first to formulate and pass,
a Declaratory Judgment Act; but at a very early period in the history
of legislation on this subject in the United States, Indiana lawyers and
legislators realized the great possibilities and fruitful field open to such
an Act, and their foresight culminated in the Declaratory Judgment
Act of Indiana in 1927.1 Section 2 of the Indiana Act provides that,
"Any person interested under a deed, will, written contract, or other
writing constituting a contract, may have determined any question of
construction or validity arising undei the instrument and obtain a
declaration of rights, sthtus or other legal relation thereunder." 7 The
interest contemplated by the statute means a substantial interest as
may by decree of court be either enlarged or diminished. The Indiana
Statute is a very good criterion for determining who is, and who is not
the real party in interest." 8 Any person may have determined any
question of construction or validity and obtain a declaration of rights,
status, or other legal relation thereunder." This must be a bona fide
question and jurisdiction will never be assumed unless the tribunal
appealed to is satisfied, that an actual controversy, or the ripening
cause of one, exists between the parties, all of whom are before the
court.:
Another very useful field for Declaratory Judgment Acts is in the
determination of validity of statutes. The Act provides, "Any person
interested, whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected by
a statute, municipal ordinance, contract or franchise, may, have determined any question of construction or validity, arising under the instrument, statute, ordinance, contract or franchise, and obtain a declaration
of rights, or other legal relations thereunder." Particularly useful will
an action of declarator be found in regard to the validity of zoning acts
and its various sections.: "A contract may be construed either before
or after there has been a breach thereof." This means oral as well
as written contracts and will prove a great aid in avoiding expensive
litigation and the hazard of breaking a contract because a party, or even
an attorney has misconstrued it. "The court may refuse to rendeg
or enter a "deciaratory judgment or decree where such judgment or
decree, if rendered or entered, would not terminate the uncertainty or
controversy giving rise to the proceedings." This section eliminates
6 IND. ANN. STAT. (BuRNs, Supp. OF 1929) § 680. 2.
7 Hemmenway v. Corey, 16 Vt. 225 (1844).
8 IND. ANN. STAT. (BuRNs, 1926) 258.
! Axton v. Goodman, 265 S. W. 806 (Ky. 1924).
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the objection of invalidity because a court may not be called upon to
decide moot questions. "All orders, judgments, and decrees under this
act may be reviewed as other orders, judgments, and decrees." This
section permits appeals to courts of general jurisdiction from justice
courts, if justice courts are to have jurisdiction to render declaratory
judgments. The mode of review is the same as in any.other proceeding.
As to the jurisdiction to be assumed, the act grants the courts of
record within their jurisdiction, power to render declaratory judgments.
"Further relief based on a declaratory judgment or decree may be
granted whenever necessary and proper. The application therefore shall
be by petition to a court having jurisdiction to grant the relief." Ifthe
application is sufficient, the court shall then, on reasonable notice given.
require the adverse parties, to come in and state why further relief
should not be aranted. "When a proceeding tinder this act involves
the determination of an issue of fact, such issue may be tried and
determined in the same manner that issues of fact are tried and determined in other civil actions in the court in which the proceedinz is
pending." This authorizes a trial by jury if demanded and removes
any constitutional objection that the act infringes on the Bill of Riahts
preserving the right of trial by iury. "In any proceeding tinder this
act the court may make such award of costs as may he deemed equitable and just." This Pives the court great discretionary control over
the right to apportion thecosts or tax them against either one of the
parties.
"When declaratory relief is sought, all ner.ons shall be made parties
who have or claim any interest which would be affected by the declaration and no declaration shall Dreiudice the rights of persons not parties
to the proceedings." As to who shall be made parties defendant section
20 of the Civil Code is to be followed. 10 The Act provides that the
word "person" means any partnershin. ioint stock company, unincorporated association or society or municipal or other corporation of any
character whatsoever. The several sections of the Act. except section 1.
providing what the Act is, are declared to be independent aind severable
and the invalidity of any part or feature thereof shall not affect or
render the rest of the Act invalid, or inoperative. After. comparing the
above provisions with "the Constitution, it does not appear that any
part or feature of any section of the Act is unconstitutional.
The gradual but eventual tendency in this country is to adopt the
body of declaratory adiective law, so necessary to orderly procedure:
and. it seems to be only a question of time until it will be as widely
used in the United States as it is in England. The power of the

10 IND. ANN. STAT. (Burns, 1926) 276; De Charette v. St. Matthews Bank
and Trust Co., 283 S.W. 410 (Ky. 1926).

